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ABSTRACT：
This study considers the influence and meaning of financial accounting after the Bank of 
Japan（BOJ）implemented a monetary easing policy. It argues that the policy changed the 
meaning of the BOJ’s balance sheet, intentionally allowing items on the debit and/or credit 
side to be devalued, while allowing the balance sheet itself to expand. 
The study examines three points：
1.  Possible conflicts between the accounting information and the BOJ’s purpose,
2.  The BOJ’s operational accounting procedures and the role of capital, and
3.   The financial statement’s meaning under either the conventional or unconventional 
policy.
From the above examination, two main features of the BOJ’s financial statements were 
identified：
1.  Weigh up anchor from the balance sheet and
2.  Release from the balance sheet.
Under the unconventional monetary easing policy, these features are apparent, thus posing 
the risk of excessive, if not perpetual, balance sheet expansion.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper examines if the meaning of the Bank of Japan’s（BOJ）financial statements 
has changed in the move of the BOJ monetary policy by focusing on their accounting 
treatment. The BOJ was changed into the unconventional policy to which monetary base 
is made to increase from the conventional policy which operates the interest rate for over-
night loan. Many arguments have emerged both for and against the BOJ’s monetary eas-
ing policy since it was adopted in March 2001. The BOJ served as a pioneer central bank 
in its use of an unconventional monetary policy, which BOJ intended to use to overcome 
persistent deflation. 
This policy was maintained from March 2001 to March 2006. According to the BOJ’s 
press release on March 19, 2001, the policy entailed shifting the bank’s focus from the un-
collateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the BOJ’s current account, 
the goal of which would be to reach approximately five trillion yen（BOJ, 2001）．
Several studies have suggested that the policy had restrictive consequences during its 
term（Harada, 2004；Hattori, 2007；Shirakawa, 2008；Ukai, 2006）．Former BOJ governor 
Shirakawa（2008）summarized the newspaper editorials’ main points, representing their 
negative assessment of the policy’s ability to stimulate the economy.
After the Lehman shock, the BOJ revived its monetary easing policy. This time, the pol-
icy entailed qualitative as well as quantitative easing. However, critical studies have indi-
cated that this monetary easing policy cannot overcome deflation（Hayashibara, 2010；
Miwa, 2011；Yumoto, 2010）．
Many of these critical studies conducted examinations by economic category. However, 
the author’s investigation of the literature found few examinations by accounting category. 
Few papers examined the BOJ balance sheet and determined the significance of its size 
and composition（Furuichi and Mori, 2005；Shiratsuka, 2009）．However, a certain index, of 
being tolerance level if a capital─adequacy ratio is how much, on financial statements is 
not shown. Does the financial accounting clarify the financial condition of the organization 
concerned or does the activity provide clarity, as in the case of the BOJ? 
Article 3 of the BOJ’s accounting rules explains that“accounting practices of the Bank 
shall be conducted taking into consideration the generally accepted principles of corporate 
accounting and the Bank’s financial soundness.”Shirakawa（2008：16）stated,“Central 
banks practice policy by manipulating the dimension and structure of their balance 
sheets.”This comment leads us to consider the correlation between policy and the func-
tion of accounting. When the scale of a balance sheet can be expanded freely, what do ac-
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counts mean?
Accordingly, this study examines the meaning of the BOJ’s financial accounting and its 
influence on the BOJ monetary easing policy, considering the correlation between the poli-
cy and the related accounting procedure. It examines the issue of a central bank operating 
without balance sheet limitations and discusses the implications of such a change.
2.  THE BOJ’S ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
2.1  THE BOJ’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Accounting information helps assessment and decision making by providing shared, ac-
curate financial status information. Private corporations operate for a common purpose—
earning profits. Their financial statements represent the operation’s results, i.e., whether 
the purpose was attained. Thus, the accounting system provides a lens（profits）to ratio-
nally comprehend both the operation’s process and result. The central bank has a different 
specific purpose, which its accounting information should be in accordance with. The pur-
pose of the BOJ and its accounting practices are as follows：
Bank of Japan Act；
Article 1 The purpose of the Bank of Japan, or the central bank of Japan, is to issue 
banknotes and to carry out currency and monetary control.
Article 2 Currency and monetary control by the Bank of Japan shall be aimed at achiev-
ing price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national econo-
my.
Accounting Rules of the Bank of Japan；
Article 3 The accounting practices of the Bank shall be conducted taking into consider-
ation the generally accepted principles of corporate accounting and the Bank’s financial 
soundness.
Although the BOJ’s accounting practices are similar to those used in corporate account-
ing, the institutions’ purposes differ. Private corporations aim to multiply their capital, 
whereas the BOJ aims to stabilize prices. Even if the BOJ’s accounting practices mimicked 
those of corporate accounting, their roles—and therefore the associated decisions and as-
sessments—will still differ. An official BOJ publication explains the significance and objec-
tive of its accounting information as follows：
In the Bank’s statement of income, operating income consisted mostly of interest on 
JGSs purchased through open market operations and gains on sales of JGSs［Japanese 
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government securities］．（Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, 2012：45）．
The Bank of Japan conducts its policies and business operations to achieve the objec-
tives stipulated in the Bank of Japan Act. These policies and business operations are re-
flected in the Bank’s balance sheet. In that sense, its balance sheet changes in accor-
dance with economic and financial developments and the Bank’s policies and business 
operations in response to such developments （ibid.：49）．
After a certain amount of the Bank’s net income is transferred to legal reserves and 
dividends are paid, the rest of the net income is paid to the Japanese government（ibid.：
50）．
The appropriation of surplus prescribed in the Bank of Japan Act is given as follows：
Article 53 The Bank of Japan shall reserve, as a reserve fund, five─hundredths of the 
surplus resulting from the settlement of profits and losses for each business year.
（4）The Bank of Japan may, upon authorization from the Minister of Finance, pay divi-
dends to contributories out of the surplus resulting from the settlement of profits and 
losses for each business year； provided, however, that the rate of dividend payments 
against paid─up capital may not exceed five─hundredths per annum.
The total portion of legal reserves and dividends is slight, so the majority of the profit is 
paid to the Japanese government. Obviously refunding the JGBS’ interest to the Japanese 
government is not the expected role of the BOJ.
The meaning of a central bank’s financial reporting was discussed in an article by the 
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies（Furuichi and Mori, 2005）．According to the 
article, a financial report provides useful information
（1）when foreseeing ex post verification of a policy and examining the range of 
executable actions in the future, and
（2）when evaluating whether management of assets or seigniorage is suitable.
In these contexts, earning profits does not have the same positive significance it has in 
corporate accounting. The BOJ places far more significance on the balance sheet than on 
income statements. Yet, the balance sheet does not lead to a positive action；on the con-
trary, the balance sheet only reflects a policy’s execution. Unlike in corporate accounting, 
figures in the financial statements do not necessarily indicate some specific action. There-
fore, we conclude that the BOJ’s financial statements are passive. In essence, the BOJ’s fi-
nancial statements serve as a memorandum of the operation.
2.2  OPERATION AND ACCOUNTING RECORD
The BOJ executes its operation according to its aims. One of these is to issue banknotes, 
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while another is to implement currency and monetary controls. Here, we use the BOJ’s fi-
nancial statements to investigate if the BOJ’s actual operations align with its stated aims.
The cash outstanding balance is controlled through funds─supplying operations. The 
BOJ creates the electronic money that banks use to make payments to other banks. When 
the BOJ buys financial assets（mainly government bonds）on the market, it intakes an 
item and outputs money into the market through the current accounts that each financial 
institution（FI）owns as reserves. When it sells financial assets, it outputs an item and in-
takes money from the market through the same account. Therefore, buying financial as-
sets increases the money supply, whereas selling financial assets reduces it.
The journal entry for this transaction is as follows. When the BOJ retires the outstand-
ing balance, the journal entry is reversed.
The BOJ journal entries Funds─supplying operations
（Assets）
Financial assets
+
（Liabilities）
FIs current account
+
Operations are conducted via a market in which a financial institution always participates, 
so the financial institution’s balance sheet confirms the operation’s consequences. The be-
havior of a financial institution’s balance sheet is as follows：
FIs journal entries Funds─supplying operations
（Assets）
BOJ current account
+
（Assets）
Financial assets
−
When FIs withdraw cash from the BOJ account, the journal entry for the transaction is 
as follows：
The BOJ journal entries Issuance of banknote operations
（Liabilities）
BOJ current account
−
（Liabilities）
Cash outstanding
+
The financial institution’s balance sheet behaves as follows：
FIs journal entries Funds─supplying operations
（Assets）
Cash
+
（Assets）
BOJ current account
−
The BOJ’s first journal entry seems reasonable. They buy financial assets from the fi-
nancial institution on credit. Their balance sheet expands from this transaction by elec-
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tronic money. However, the next journal entry’s category classification is disputable. The 
cash outstanding is journalized as a liability when a financial institution draws out cash 
from the BOJ’s account. The BOJ issues the cash as a banknote. What does it mean for 
economies—and banks—everywhere if banknotes adopt the nature of a liability? The 
IASB framework defines a liability as follows：
A liability is a present obligation of the enterprise arising from past events, the settle-
ment of which is expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources em-
bodying economic benefits.
Let us clarify the nature of these journal entries considering the definition of liability. The 
FIs current account is settled by cash when a financial institution draws out from the BOJ 
account. Cash is usually an asset；in that sense, the FI’s account reserves are a liability. 
However, the BOJ issues the cash as a banknote as per request. Banknote issuance is not 
a present obligation of the BOJ. The BOJ’s banknote itself is not necessary to settle by an 
outflow of resources embodying economic benefits because it is cash itself. Therefore, we 
must ask if the FI’s current account is actually a liability.
Journalizing a banknote as a liability is explained on the BOJ’s website as follows：
When seen historically, a banknote’s exchange for gold or silver was guaranteed since 
the BOJ’s founding.（omission）It can be said that the banknotes that have such charac-
ter are debt security.（omission）Even now, there is no change in character； a BOJ 
banknote is a“bill of debt”that must secure approval, and it is still appropriated as a li-
ability.
（https：//www.boj.or.jp/announcements/education/oshiete/outline/a23.htm/）
The above─mentioned article from the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies also 
explained the journal entry as follows：
Although it is concluded that the debt’s nature as a requirement for debt appropriation 
in business accounting was filled under the standard monetary system on the condition 
of conversion to gold or silver, this point does not necessarily hold following a shift to a 
managed currency system. Instead, it seems that the central bank’s capital account con-
sists of capital that can be classified as contributed capital, a legal reserve saved in the 
process of appropriating a fundamental profit, and is recognized as such because only 
that which can be lost through lack of developmental time can be appropriated. If this is 
accurate, it will be considered easy to appropriate a banknote to be issued for a debt 
succeedingly as classification on accounts（Furuichi and Mori, 2005：137）．
According to this description, a banknote is mainly recognized as a liability because of 
historical precedent. Recognizing banknotes as a liability is reasonable under the convert-
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ible currency system. A central bank must exchange banknotes for gold or silver on re-
quest from the banknote’s holder. However, under the managed currency system, the ac-
counting procedure for banknote issuance does not have a positive logic, leading to the 
following arguments against the BOJ’s accounting procedure：
There is also a view that makes the issuance of currency the national government ’s 
debt. When considered as a debt, currency has no term of payment and no interest. So, 
comprehending this issuance poses a significant issue. Should it be classified and indicat-
ed separately from other profits or classified as a debt?（Fudeya et al., 2004：238）．
The form of the money in a managed currency system is the same as that of the central 
bank’s non─voting stock, wherein the substance’s authorization by law was carried out 
in non─dividend also with a debt（Iwamura and Watanabe, 2004：34）．
Thus, Fudeya, Iwamura and Watanabe alluded that classifying banknotes as a liability is 
unreasonable. When a private corporation raises money, it is journalized as either a liabili-
ty or capital, and the corporation faces regulations regarding correct journalizing of its 
transactions. And judgment of the safety of the private corporation is about whether it is 
journalized as a liability whether it journalizes as a capital, and changes.
Now we address the question of whether the meaning of the BOJ’s balance sheets would 
differ by the banknotes category, whether it is a liability or a capital. The BOJ’s view is as 
follows：
The Bank holds its capital base, such as capital, legal reserves, and provisions, to be pre-
pared for potential losses. The Bank measures its capital adequacy ratio by dividing the 
amount of its capital base by the annual average of banknotes issued, and accumulates 
provisions and legal reserves to maintain its financial soundness（Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies, 2012：50）．
The above cases of actual behavior of some central banks indicate that central banks’ 
concern with the soundness of their capital base might not be grounded purely in eco-
nomic theory but may be motivated rather by the political economic instincts of central 
bankers. In other words, once the restriction that“the central bank should only take 
risks consistent with the level of its self─imposed capital base”is violated, the boundary 
between the functions of the central bank and those of the government may become dif-
ficult to discern（Fukui, 2003）．
The BOJ seems to make a point regarding capital adequacy ratio. A private corporation 
calculates its capital adequacy ratio by dividing the amount of its capital（stockholders’ eq-
uity）by the annual average of the gross capital（liabilities + capital）．Calculation of the 
BOJ’s capital adequacy ratio excludes other liabilities from the denominator. Other liabili-
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ties primarily consist of commercial banks’ account reserves and the government deposits. 
The fact that these liabilities could be financed by the banknotes might explain this exclu-
sion. The BOJ seems to consider the final settlement instrument as a liability. The BOJ is 
showing this criterion in the table of“The Bank’s Capital Base and Capital Adequacy Ra-
tio”on their Annual Review（BOJ 2013：61）．The fact of showing on their annual review 
reveals that they put significance on this criterion. And this ratio is directly fluctuated by 
the amount of outstanding banknotes. 
These indications contradict the Bank of Japan Act’s restriction on the appropriation of 
surplus. If capital is so important, why does the act not restrict payments to the Japanese 
government so that they come only from profit? This question was addressed in the 
speech“The Role of Capital for Central Banks”by former BOJ policy board member Ka-
zuo Ueda at the Japan Society of Monetary Economics on October 25, 2003（Ueda, 2003）．
After discussing other central banks, he stated,“Summing up the experiences of insolvent 
central banks, my conclusion is that the maintenance of a sound balance sheet is, in gener-
al, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fulfilling a central bank's responsibility, 
but there have been cases where an unhealthy balance sheet became a major obstacle to 
price stability.”The conclusion of the speech was ambiguous, pointing out that the BOJ’s 
financial strength would deteriorate under certain economic conditions. However, this con-
cern is not directly connected with the obstacles to achieving their goal of maintaining 
price stability, as these obstacles remain merely a“probability.”Furthermore, even though 
the title of the speech included“The Role of Capital,”Ueda did not clarify the function of 
capital.
A balance sheet expresses an organization’s financial condition, and aggravation of a bal-
ance sheet inevitably has a decisive meaning in an organization’s operations. Therefore, 
the question of whether the aggravation of the BOJ’s finances reflects a malfunction within 
the organization is highly significant. Their financial statement’s meaning can be identified 
by examining the connection between accounting practices and their actual operations as 
indicated by their financial policy.
3.  MEANING OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN FINANCIAL POLICY 
In this section, we examine the meaning of the BOJ’s financial statements under two 
policy types：conventional and unconventional policy.
Under a conventional policy, the overnight interbank rate serves as an operational tar-
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get. The BOJ influences supply and demand for both funds and interest─rate formation in 
money markets by adjusting financial institutions’ current account balances at the BOJ 
through market operations as detailed in the Table 1 and Table 2.
Money circulating in a market remains in prosperity, and it is assimilated by a funds─
absorbing operation during inflation. A funds─absorbing operation functions as a tight─
money policy.
On the other hand, when the money circulating in a market is insufficient, additional 
Table 1　Types of Funds─supplying Operations
*The start day is the day on which funds and securities are settled after an operation and that marks the 
beginning of the term of the operation.“T”in“T + α”stands for the day of trade, which here indicates the day of 
offering, on which the Bank issues notice to the eligible counterparty to the operation regarding the type of 
operation, the amount of funds, and the start day.“α”indicates the number of business days from the day of 
offering to the start day. Depending on financial market conditions, however, start days other than those indicated 
above may be used. 
Table 2　Types of Funds─absorbing Operations
Source：Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan（2012）：121–22 Figure 5─3
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money is injected by a funds─supplying operation during deflation. Funds─supplying opera-
tions serve as a monetary easing policy. These conventional policies do not generally re-
quire financial restraint. Conversely, a corporation almost always operates under condi-
tions of financial restraint. It raises money for its operations and invests in specific assets, 
and both the type and amount of assets that a corporation can own are restricted by the 
amount of money raised and the corporation’s capacity. The corporation’s balance sheet 
indicates its financial condition as well as factors such as its safety degree and capability. 
However, the BOJ does not face the same financial restraints. In an inflationary market, 
the BOJ absorbs money by selling gilts until the overnight interbank rate’s level of neces-
sity is achieved. Conversely, in a deflationary market, the BOJ supplies money by purchas-
ing gilts until the overnight interbank rate’s level of necessity is achieved. No ceiling ex-
ists, especially for purchasing gilts. The BOJ turns the balance in financial institutions’ 
current account into a liability through such purchasing operations—a conversion that 
might lead to a potentially limitless expansion of the balance sheet’s scale. The BOJ’s un-
conditional finance is disputable, although it did not escalate into a major problem as long 
as it remained within predictable market fluctuations. However, as part of the BOJ’s un-
conventional policy, the problem can no longer be ignored.
The BOJ first moved toward an unconventional monetary easing policy in March 2001 
to conquer persistent deflation. Under a monetary easing policy, the BOJ targeted its cur-
rent account’s outstanding balance. However, the target changed from the overnight inter-
bank rate to the balance of the items in the balance sheet—a swap in operational target 
that allows the balance sheet to easily expand. 
As shown in Figure 1, in the conventional policy, the BOJ conducted indirect business ad-
justments by manipulating interest within the limits of supply and demand in the indirect─
financing mainstream financial market. In the unconventional policy as shown in Figure 2, 
the BOJ is urged to engage in direct business adjustment exceeding demand in the direct─
financing mainstream financial market. Expansion of the BOJ’s balance sheet is according-
ly enhanced.
The Bank of Japan’s Financial Statements’ Peculiarity　　25
Therefore, the BOJ established the“banknote principle”as an avoidance measure. Its 
principle was explained during the March 19, 2001 announcement concerning new proce-
dures for money market operations and monetary easing：
The Bank will increase the amount of its outright purchase of long─term government 
bonds from the current 400 billion yen per month, in case it considers that increase to 
be necessary for providing liquidity smoothly. The outright purchase is, on the other 
hand, subject to the limitation that the outstanding amount of long ─term government 
bonds effectively held by the Bank, i.e., after taking account of the government bond 
sales under gensaki repurchase agreements, be kept below the outstanding balance of 
banknotes issued（BOJ, 2001）．
Ultimately, this principle asserts that the amount of banknotes in circulation comprises the 
BOJ’s long─term liabilities, whereas the balance of purchased government bonds is consid-
ered as long─term assets. Accordingly, the outstanding balance of banknotes should be 
backed by purchased government bonds（Miyao, 2013）．As the accounts largest asset bal-
ance is restricted to matching its largest liability balance, expansion of the balance sheet is 
prevented. This seems to be a sensible policy in response to a legitimate concern over the 
unconventional policy’s implications.
However, the BOJ actually enacted this principle to dispel public concerns over fiscal 
dominance and maintain the credit to the banknote referred to the adequate money sup-
ply. In reality, the unconventional monetary easing policy serves as direct financing to the 
government. A central bank providing direct financing to a government is worrying in 
terms of both future policy implications and economic consequences.
Figure 1　The BOJ’s role in the conventional policy
Monetary 
Supply
Monetary
Demands
Financial 
Institution
BOJ 
Financial  
Institution
Monetary
Demand
Monetary 
BOJ 
Supply
Figure 2　The BOJ’s role in the unconventional policy
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4.  BANKNOTE CREDIBILITY
To clarify the banknote problem, we determine the implications of the above policy’s fi-
nancial effects by examining the government’s and central bank’s procedures. 
Nobel Prize─winning economist Joseph Stiglitz spoke on“Deflation, Globalization and the 
New Paradigm of Monetary Economics”at Japan’s Ministry of Finance on April 16, 2003
（Stiglitz, 2003）．His speech referred to the issuance of government notes, setting off a wid-
er debate. In response to Stiglitz’s argument, Professor Oguri, the BOJ’s ex management, 
published research referencing preceding studies and describing the difference between 
government notes and central banknotes（Oguri, 2011）．His argument comprised the fol-
lowing points：
（1）Is the issuance based on the credit relationship?
A central bank usually acquires collateral assets when issuing banknotes；this transac-
tion forms the relationship of debit and credit. Banknotes, including central banknotes, are 
issued only through financial transactions. The government bears no liability when issuing 
notes. 
（2）Is the issuance endogenous or exogenous?
Credit money, including banknotes, is essentially a bill of debt, primarily based on the 
commodity’s value. However, government notes are isolated from their commodity value 
and injected from outside the economy.
（3）Is the issuance an administrative or business act? 
A central banknote is both a bill of debt and credit money, whereas the issuance of a 
government note is an administrative act. The government takes forcible measures to is-
sue government notes. Although a government note is a debt, it has no due date and car-
ries no interest.
Oguri emphasized that a central bank issues notes within the financial market. Because 
a central banknote is a debt, it returns to the bank at the end of the credit relationship.
On examining the procedure of issuing government notes, in particular the accounting 
treatment, we identify similarities with that of issuing central banknotes. The two proce-
dures can be compared as follows.
（1）The government issues government notes to the central bank, which puts them into 
circulation. The same treatment is given to coins currently issued by the government. The 
journal entry of the central bank would therefore be as follows：
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（Assets）
Government note
+
（Liabilities）
Government deposits
+
The central bank issues government notes through acquisition and/or expenditure. Their 
journal entry would therefore be as follows：
（Assets or Expenses）
An item of assets/
expense
+
（Assets）
Government note
−
When the note returns to the bank, the corresponding journal entry would be the reverse 
of the above.
（2）The government issues government bonds to the central bank, and the central bank 
possesses them as assets. This treatment increases the balance of the government deposit, 
And the central bank continues to hold these assets. When the government withdraw 
some amounts from the account, the central bank issue the banknote. If we compare this 
treatment with the above (1) case, the balance of the items of an account are different but 
the actual financial condition is the same.
Oguri further stated that the sequence of a government note’s issuance means that the 
central bank retains it with neither due date nor interest. Such behavior is as if the gov-
ernment forced the central bank to accept government bonds without due dates and inter-
est. He opposes issuing government notes because they ignore the market principle, in-
stead preferring the issuance of central banknotes, as they are based on a debit/credit 
relationship and are therefore reliable. 
Banknote issuance is executed as market transactions, which is as per Oguri’s state-
ments. However, under the monetary easing policy, financial institutions purchase govern-
ment bonds in the market on the basis of a prediction that the BOJ would purchase these 
bonds. Such an assumption renders the market transaction a mere formality. Moreover, 
the accounting procedure and its consequence on the BOJ’s balance sheet is nearly identi-
cal for banknote and government note issuance.
5.  MEANING OF THE BOJ’S FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Despite its consequences thus far, the BOJ has promoted the monetary easing policy, 
announcing the introduction of“quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.”The BOJ 
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intends to double in two years not only the monetary base and the outstanding amounts of 
Japanese government bonds but also exchange─traded funds, as well as more than dou-
bling the average remaining maturity of Japanese government bond purchases. Moreover, 
the BOJ enacted a temporary suspension of the banknote principle（BOJ, 2013）．Although 
only enacted in 2001, its suspension is significant as it enables the BOJ to expand their bal-
ance sheet without limit, subject only to decisions concerning the“necessity”of govern-
ment bond purchases. Fundamentally, suspension releases the BOJ from the limitation im-
posed by the balance sheet. As previously discussed, while the corporate operations are 
limited by their raised funds, BOJ operations are not. Even prior to the banknote principle, 
the BOJ had already sought to avoid the limitations imposed by the balance sheet. This fi-
nancial property of the BOJ is inherent merely under the managed currency system. To 
find functional limitations on the BOJ’s operations, we must trace back to the convertible 
currency system.
In the convertible currency system, a banknote substituted for the commodity money
（gold or silver）．For example, a central bank was obliged to convert the issued banknote 
to gold bullion under the gold exchange standard. A central bank is therefore needed to 
maintain a certain amount of reserves to conduct such conversion transactions. The link 
Table 3　BOJ’s Balance Sheet
(thousand yen)
%%
%9.73733,964,175,38setonknaB%2.0904,352,144dloG
%4.54774,627,079,99stisopedtnerruC%1.0136,611,092hsaC
%2.0187,520,973stisopedrehtO%1.28088,391,658,081seitirucestnemnrevogesenapaJ
Commercial paper 2,024,206,093 0.9% Government deposit 1,422,466,573 0.6%
Corporate bonds
3,291,860,220
1.5%
Payables under repurchase
174,757,255,82stnemeerga
13.0%
Pecuniary trusts
 (stocks held as trust property) 1,360,510,447
0.6% Others
186,750,889
0.1%
Pecuniary trusts
(index-linked exchange-traded
funds held as trust property) 2,406,429,438
1.1% Provisions
3,539,280,396
1.6%
Pecuniary trusts
 (Japan real estate investment
trusts held as trust property) 139,250,963
0.1% Capital
100,000
0.0%
Loans
(excluding those to the Deposit
Insurance Corporation) 23,820,090,000
10.8% Legal and special reserves
2,741,438,419
1.2%
Foreign currency assets 5,207,978,768 2.4%
Deposits with agents 23,240,807 0.0%
%2.0586,488,205srehtO
%0.001343,510,463,022latoT%0.001143,510,463,022latoT
(source: Bank of Japan (2013) Bank of Japan Accounts November 20, 2013)
Assets Liabilities and Capital Accounts
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between currency and the value of actual commodity holdings limited banknote issuance 
to the asset balance of the item subject to conversion. In such a system, the balance sheet 
indicates if the central bank’s financial condition is stable. In that sense, the balance sheet 
reflects real substantial capital. In the transition to the managed currency system, the cen-
tral bank’s financial obligations undergo a change. No intrinsic limitations on banknote is-
suance exist in the managed currency system. Instead, the BOJ focuses on an economic 
indicator that cannot be directly controlled. As this operational indicator is external, it has 
no connection with their financial figures. Therefore, the balance sheet reflects merely the 
consequences of the BOJ’s operations, not the health of the wider economy or financial 
system. 
Table 3 summarizes the BOJ balance sheet disclosure. The valuation measure of securities 
in assets is prescribed in the BOJ’s Accounting Rules：
Article 13 At the ends of the first half of every fiscal year and of the full fiscal year, se-
curities shall be valued as follows.（1）Yen─denominated bonds and commercial paper 
shall be valued at amortized cost determined by the moving─average method. 
Therefore, deterioration of“Japanese government securities,”which comprise 82% of the 
BOJ’s total assets at this period, would not directly affect their capital. Even though dete-
rioration of the asset would affect capital, it would not serve as a direct cause of financial 
disrepute as the meaning of the capital is ambiguous. 
The meaning of the BOJ’s balance sheet has shifted in the transition process to the man-
aged currency system. The change can be summarized as follows：
（1）Weigh up anchor from the balance sheet.
The prescription of holding reserves of substantial assets prevented the BOJ from expe-
riencing balance sheet expansion. The withdrawal of this prescription gave the BOJ free 
reign over their operations.
（2）Release from the balance sheet.
Since the prescription’s withdrawal, the BOJ is no longer bound by any item on a bal-
ance sheet. As a result, the balance sheet became merely a memorandum record. 
The currency system’s transition also changed the meaning of the BOJ’s balance sheet. 
This financial statements’ peculiarity, the BOJ balance sheet just shows the memorandum, 
has been increasingly evident under the monetary easing policy, especially given the eradi-
cation of the banknote principle.
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6.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICY
The BOJ terminated its first introduction of the unconventional policy by March 2006. For-
mer Governor of the BOJ Shirakawa summarized the effect of the monetary easing policy 
in his book,“Modern Monetary Policy in Theory and Practice”and emphasized the policy 
duration effect（2008：344─70）．If the BOJ upheld the monetary easing policy to maintain a 
zero rate“until deflationary concerns are dispelled,”the effect can be obtained.
Okina has highlighted the influence of the potential future inflation resulting from the 
unconventional policy differences between FRB and BOJ, despite both having followed the 
same policy. While Bernanke stated that“the size of the FRB balance sheet has no effect 
on the inflationary predictions,”the BOJ announced the monetary easing policy would 
maintain a zero rate until the attainment of the 2% inflation target. The BOJ aims to influ-
ence the general public’s price predictions（Okina, 2013：243–50）．Given the lack of limita-
tions on the balance of item on the balance sheet, the BOJ can therefore operate freely 
and is limited only by its intentions. However, despite its intentions, the BOJ cannot di-
rectly influence the general public’s price predictions. Its balance sheet does not possess 
sufficient capital, although the same cannot be said of the fictitious capital expressed on its 
balance sheet.
The BOJ’s balance sheet has been reduced to a mere memorandum record, and the ulti-
mate outcome of unfettered expansion remains undetermined. Given the unknown out-
come but the very real, potent risks that can be surmised, one can argue that the BOJ has 
already expanded its balance sheet beyond a safe level. A governmental national bond is a 
liability for the government which must be repaid at some certain point of the future un-
like banknote of BOJ. Originally it cannot be issued without the hope of future repayment. 
However, under the monetary easing policy, BOJ is continuing buying a government bond. 
The BOJ can continue performing it by the release of the financial fetters now. The 
amount issued of a government bond will exceed the capability of future repayment of the 
government someday. The balance sheet of a private corporation expresses the financial 
condition of an organization. However in fact, the balance sheet of BOJ has not expressed 
the substantial financial condition of its organization anymore. Although the independence 
of BOJ from the government is stressed, it can be said that especially the BOJ’s financial 
condition has been integrated with the government under unconventional monetary policy. 
It became impossible to say that the balance sheet of the BOJ expresses financial condi-
tion by becoming a mere memorandum. Therefore, it had not necessarily become a big 
problem directly to having removed banknote principle. The brake stopped however, 
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starting expansion of a balance sheet by having removed fetters completely. In fact, a cap-
ital─adequacy ratio will be scrutinized, as long as the rule of a private corporation is used, 
though the balance sheet expresses the mere fictitious capital. It is unknown how far a 
market permits decline in the capital─adequacy ratio of BOJ. It is unknown how far a mar-
ket permits decline in the capital ─adequacy ratio of BOJ. However, it is so clear to ap-
proach a risk of exceeding the tolerance level of a market that the balance sheet of BOJ 
expands. Hence, the monetary easing policy can damage the very currency stability that 
defines the BOJ’s purpose. 
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